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Discovering Arrest Warrants:
Intervening Police Conduct and Foreseeability
On July 8, 2001 in Lake Park, Florida, Anthony Frierson was sitting in his
.1981 Plymouth sedan on Old Dixie Highway waiting for the light to turn
green. Once the green turn arrow appeared, he turned left without using his
signal. Although turning without a signal does not violate Florida traffic laws,'
Officer Steven Miller observed Frierson making the turn and pulled him over
illegally.2 When asked, Frierson provided the officer with his license, which
Miller used to run a warrants check. The check revealed an outstanding
warrant for Frierson's arrest for failure to appear in traffic court. On the basis
of that warrant, Officer Miller arrested Frierson and conducted a search
incident to arrest. That search revealed an illegal firearm, for which Frierson
was charged and later convicted.
3
In State v. Frierson, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the conviction,
permitting entry of the firearm into evidence. The court reasoned that "the
outstanding arrest warrant was a judicial order directing the arrest of
respondent whenever the respondent was located," and thus "the search was
incident to the outstanding warrant and not incident to the illegal stop."4
Although the suspicionless traffic stop violated the Federal Constitution, the
1. State v. Riley, 638 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1994).
2. A traffic stop violates the Fourth Amendment if the officer lacks probable cause or
"reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity 'may be afoot."'
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30
(1968)).
3. State v. Frierson, 926 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 20o6).
4. Id. at 1144.
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discovery of the outstanding arrest warrant had constituted an "intervening
circumstance that dissipate [d] the taint of the illegal action."'
A growing number of state supreme courts and federal courts of appeals
disagree over the question addressed in Frierson: whether the discovery of an
outstanding warrant in the course of an illegal detention dissipates the "taint"
of the initial illegality, permitting entry of evidence seized in a search incident
to arrest. Because warrants checks are routine features of many police-citizen
encounters,6 this question is a matter of substantial practical importance. Eight
courts have concluded that because officers must execute arrest warrants when
they discover them and because searches incident to arrest are constitutional,
the discovery of an arrest warrant is an intervening circumstance that
attenuates the taint of an initially illegal encounter and permits entry of the
evidence.7 At least seven other state high courts and federal courts of appeals
have concluded that evidence obtained in a search made pursuant to an illegally
discovered arrest warrant constitutes fruit of the poisonous tree and should be
suppressed.8
This Comment supports a middle ground, arguing that evidence should be
suppressed when the discovery of an arrest warrant during the course of an
illegal detention is the foreseeable result of intervening police conduct. This
approach better accommodates the exclusionary rule's purpose of deterring
illegal searches and seizures.9
For example, police often employ an investigatory technique known as a
field interview. According to this strategy, officers canvass high-crime
neighborhoods, randomly stopping pedestrians without any suspicion of
5. Id. at 1140 (quoting Frierson v. State, 851 So. 2d 293, 294 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
6. See, e.g., Golphin v. State, 945 So. 2d 1174, 1202 (Fla. 2006) (Pariente, J., concurring)
("[P] olice officers in some jurisdictions view a warrants check as a routine feature of almost
any citizen encounter."), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 40 (2007).
7. See United States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Green, iii F.3d
515 (7 th Cir. 1997); Frierson, 926 So. 2d 1139; State v. Page, 103 P.3d 454 (Idaho 2004); State
v. Martin, 179 P. 3d 4 5 7 (Kan. 2008); State v. Hill, 725 So. 2d 1282 (La. 1998); Myers v. State,
909 A.2d 1048 (Md. 2006); Jacobs v. State, 128 P.3d 1o85 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006); see also
State v. Dunn, 172 P.3d 11o, 115-16 (Mont. 2007) (Leaphart, J., concurring) (arguing that
discovery of an outstanding warrant cures an illegal home search).
8. See United States v. Lopez, 443 F.3d 128o (ioth Cit. 2006); United States v. Luckett, 484
F.2d 89 (9th Cit. 1973); People v. Padgett, 932 P.2d 81o (Colo. 1997); Sikes v. State, 448
S.E.2d 560 (S.C. 1994); State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420 (Tenn. 2000); St. George v. State,
237 S.W.3 d 7 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); State v. Topanotes, 76 P.3 d 1159 (Utah 2003).
9. See, e.g., Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998); 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 11.4(a), at 259 (4th ed.
2004) (describing deterrence as the exclusionary rule's "most fundamental point").
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criminal activity."° An officer initiates consensual contact with a pedestrian and
asks to see his identification. When the pedestrian complies, the officer holds
on to it while running a warrants check, a process that can take as long as
fifteen minutes. Several courts have concluded that retaining the citizen's
identification for a warrants check effects a seizure of the pedestrian."
Because it is foreseeable that the warrants check will reveal any open
warrants for a particular individual, the Frierson rule incentivizes officers to
retain the identification unconstitutionally in order to run the check. If the
check does not reveal a warrant, then the officer lets the individual go, having
spent only a few minutes of time. If the warrants check does reveal an open
warrant, the officer obtains legal authorization to conduct a search incident to
the arrest, and the unconstitutionality of the stop is rendered irrelevant. Only
when the discovery of an arrest warrant is not foreseeable -such as when an
individual volunteers without police solicitation that he has an open warrant,
or when the officer has independent knowledge of an open warrant 2 -will
suppression fail to prevent future unconstitutional detentions. Courts,
therefore, should suppress evidence found in a search incident to an arrest
during an illegal detention any time the discovery of the warrant is the
foreseeable result of intervening police conduct.
I. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND ATTENUATION
The exclusionary rule is a settled fixture of Fourth Amendment law. The
Supreme Court has explained that "[iun order to make effective the
fundamental constitutional guarantees of sanctity of the home and inviolability
of the person ... evidence seized during an unlawful search [can] not constitute
proof against the victim of the search."' 3 This exclusionary rule is expressly
fashioned as a "judicially created means of deterring illegal searches and
1o. See, e.g., Golphin, 945 So. 2d 1174.
ii. A police officer seizes a person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when "a
reasonable person would [not] feel free 'to disregard the police and go about his business."'
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002) (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499
U.S. 621, 628 (1991)). Over one dozen state supreme courts and federal courts of appeals are
divided over whether an officer's retention of identification constitutes a seizure of the
pedestrian. Compare, e.g., Lopez, 443 F.3d 128o (seizure), with, e.g., Golphin, 945 So. 2d 1174
(no seizure).
12. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
13. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886)).
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seizures. 1 4 The rule, however, has never operated as an absolute bar. Courts
decline to apply the rule in two categories of circumstances in which
suppression would have little or no deterrent effect. First, the exclusionary rule
does not apply where the illegality is not a but-for source of the evidence
sought to be excluded."5 Suppression of evidence that would have been
discovered notwithstanding the illegal conduct will not succeed in deterring
the illegal conduct.
Second, the exclusionary rule does not apply where the connection between
the illegality and the seizure of the evidence "'become[s] so attenuated as to
dissipate the taint"' of the illegality.6 As the Supreme Court recently explained
in Hudson v. Michigan, "[E]vidence is [not] 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply
because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the
police"; it will be inadmissible only if it "has been come at by exploitation of
that illegality. 1 7 Attenuation doctrine, therefore, attempts to mark the point at
which suppression no longer deters unconstitutional police conduct because
some intervening event breaks the link between the police misconduct and
discovery of the evidence."
II. THE PROBLEM WITH FRIERSON'S ANALYSIS
The central question in Frierson was whether the discovery of an arrest
warrant constitutes such an intervening event. In addressing this question, the
Frierson opinion relied exclusively on the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in United
States v. Green. 9 On facts similar to those in Frierson, the Seventh Circuit
reasoned that "[i]t would be startling to suggest that because the police
illegally stopped an automobile, they cannot arrest an occupant who is found to
14. Scott, 524 U.S. at 363 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,348 (1974)).
15. See, e.g., Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. S33 (1988).
16. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 6o8 (1975) (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 491).
17. 547 U.S. 586, 592 (2006) (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88) (emphasis added).
18. The paradigmatic example of dissipation of a prior illegal police action is "an intervening
independent act of a free will," such as a voluntary confession. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486. In
Wong Sun, the Supreme Court declined to apply the exclusionary rule to Wong Sun's
confession even though it would not have been made but for the illegal arrest at issue in that
case. Id. at 491. The Court concluded that three days' time and an independent act of a free
will had broken the connection between the initial illegal arrest and the defendant's
voluntary confession. Id.
19. 111 F.3d 515 (7th Cit. 1997). Seven other opinions on this side of the conflict rely on Green.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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be wanted on a warrant."2" Since the arrest was lawfully made pursuant to the
warrant, the "search incident to the arrest [was] also lawful."2 The court
decided that the discovery of the warrant therefore must have constituted an
intervening circumstance that dissipated the taint of the illegal stop.
By working backward from the legality of the arrest, however, both courts
inverted the legal question at issue. The relevant exclusionary rule doctrine
asks whether an intervening event attenuates the initial illegality; if it does, it
will render the evidence admissible. The Frierson and Green courts concluded
instead that if evidence is admissible (it would be "startling" to suggest
otherwise), the admissibility renders the intervening event attenuating. That
approach, of course, puts the cart before the horse. Determining that the
evidence of one crime should be suppressed notwithstanding the discovery of
an arrest warrant for another crime does not operate as an indictment of the
legality of the arrest; it operates instead as an indictment of the precedent
illegal detention.
The folly of the courts' analytical inversion comes into sharp relief when set
against the value underlying the exclusionary rule: deterrence of
unconstitutional police conduct. In fact, the eight courts on this side of the
conflict have effectively encouraged police officers to conduct unconstitutional
fishing expeditions for open warrants in order to undertake "legal" (but
otherwise impermissible) searches.2" The Frierson rule encourages officers not
only to canvass high-crime neighborhoods, therefore, but also to stop any
vehicle without cause and in violation of the Fourth Amendment. So long as
the officers run a warrants check and discover a warrant, they will be free to
20. Id. at 521. The Florida Supreme Court offered similar reasoning in Frierson. See supra text
accompanying note 4.
21. Green, ill F. 3d at 521.
22. The discovery of an open warrant is likely not independently sufficient to incentivize such
unconstitutional detentions. The great majority of outstanding warrants are issued for
trivial offenses, particularly the failure to appear in traffic court. See, e.g., RANDALL GUYNES
& RUSSELL WOLFF, UN-SERVED ARREST WARRANTS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY 1 (2004),
available at http://www.ilj.org/publications/FinalWarrantsReport.pdf ("The largest single
group of outstanding warrants at any time is composed of bench warrants for failure to
appear in court ... [for] traffic citations."). Very few outstanding warrants relate to major
crimes because "the police prioritize the most serious offenses" when actively serving
warrants. Id. at 24. Thus, the large majority of outstanding warrants are for traffic
violations, while only about five percent are for "major crimes." Id. at 22 exhibit 9. The
utility of discovering an open warrant therefore is generally not derived from serving the
warrant, but rather from conducting a search incident to arrest.
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search the driver and vehicle incident to the arrest and without concern of
suppression."
For these reasons, the predictable discovery of an outstanding arrest
warrant cannot logically be viewed as attenuating unconstitutional conduct in
the manner contemplated by the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the
exclusionary rule. As the Court recently observed in Hudson, "The value of
deterrence depends upon the strength of the incentive to commit the forbidden
act."' 4 Under the Frierson rule, the incentive to make unconstitutional
detentions involving police conduct that foreseeably results in the discovery of
open warrants is extremely strong.
III. ATTENUATION, INTERVENING POLICE CONDUCT, AND
FORESEEABILITY
To improve deterrence of police officers' unconstitutional conduct, this
Comment argues that the exclusionary rule should apply notwithstanding the
discovery of an open warrant any time an officer's conduct during the course of
an unconstitutional encounter foreseeably results in the warrant's discovery.
Consider the question from a police officer's perspective. Imagine two
officers are patrolling a high-crime area and suspect that a pedestrian is
carrying illegal drugs. They know they lack reasonable suspicion and that if
they stop and search the individual, any evidence they discover will be
suppressed as unconstitutionally obtained." Cue the Frierson rule, which
suggests to the officers that if they stop the pedestrian and discover an open
warrant (most likely for an unpaid traffic violation 6), they can then conduct
the search they previously lacked cause to undertake.
23. To be certain, courts have generally recognized that the flagrancy of police misconduct is
relevant to the attenuation question, such that intentional and flagrant unconstitutional
detentions might be ruled out even under the Green analysis. See, e.g., State v. Frierson, 926
So. 2d 1139, 1143-45 (Fla. 2006). It is not clear, however, why the exclusionary rule should be
concerned with deterring only "flagrant" unconstitutional conduct. Non-flagrant
unconstitutional conduct violates the Constitution just the same. A foreseeability rule,
unlike a flagrancy rule, would prevent that conduct as well.
24. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. S86, 587 (20o6). In fact, the Frierson rule also discourages
courts from deciding important questions of Fourth Amendment law. See, e.g., Cox v. State,
916 A.2d 311, 316 (Md. 2007) (declining to decide whether retention of identification effects
a seizure because the officers had discovered an outstanding warrant).
25. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
26. See supra note 22.
118:177 20o8
DISCOVERING ARREST WARRANTS
According to the Frierson rule, the officers know three things going into the
illegal detention: (1) if they run a warrants check or inquire about warrants and
the individual has an open warrant, they will probably discover it; (2) if they
discover a warrant, any evidence they seize in the search incident to arrest will
be admissible, regardless of the illegality of the detention; and (3) if they do
not discover a warrant, they are no worse off. Thus, the Frierson rule
necessarily encourages unconstitutional detentions that include intervening
police conduct that foreseeably results in the discovery of a warrant. As a
corollary, deterrence of unconstitutional detentions requires suppression when
the discovery of the warrant is the foreseeable result of intervening police
conduct.27
To be clear, this Comment does not advocate a broad, torts-like
foreseeability rule according to which evidence should be suppressed if the
officer foresees, as a probabilistic matter, that an individual has an outstanding
arrest warrant in advance of the illegal stop. 8 Instead, it takes for granted that
it is foreseeable that anyone might have an outstanding warrant.2 9 The Frierson
rule's encouragement of officers to make illegal stops does not turn on the
specific probability that the suspect has a warrant. It turns instead on the
possibility that he has a warrant and the certainty that if he does, the police
officers will discover it. The foreseeability of the discovery of a warrant when
27. Suppression here is not meant to discourage police from checking for outstanding warrants.
Instead, it is intended only to prevent officers from using warrants checks as an end run
around the Fourth Amendment to obtain and admit evidence at trial against individuals of
whom they do not otherwise have constitutionally sufficient suspicion.
28. See David S. Anthony, State v. Zavala: Consent to Search as Attenuating the Taint of Illegal
Searches and Seizures, 38 IDAHO L. REv. 135 (2001) (arguing for a "proximate cause" test for
attenuation).
29. See Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, The Fugitive: Evidence on Public Versus Private Law
Enforcement from Bail Jumping, 47 J.L. & ECON. 93, 98-99 (2004) (detailing the distribution
of millions of open warrants across the nation). In Cincinnati, for instance, the ratio of
outstanding warrants to residents is about one-to-three; in Baltimore, it is one-to-twelve. In
all of Massachusetts, the ratio is about one-to-eight. Id; see COMMONWEALTH OF MASS.
SENATE COMM. ON POST AUDIT & OVERSIGHT, WARRANTING IMPROVEMENT: REFORMING
THE ARREST WARRANT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, S. 181-2381, 18ist Sess., § 1 & n.6 (1999),
http://www.mass.gov/legis/senate/warrant.htm (reporting 275,000 computerized open
warrants and an "excess of 5oo,ooo" additional open warrants). I calculated these ratios
using U.S. Census population data. See U.S. Census Bureau State & County QuickFacts,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/cgi-birVqfd/lookup (last visited June 23, 2008).
As mentioned previously, the great majority of outstanding warrants are for trivial,
nonviolent offenses like traffic violations. See supra note 22. Officers would have no reason
to believe that any one individual is more likely than another to have an unpaid speeding
ticket.
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the officer runs a warrants check ultimately is what undermines deterrence of
unconstitutional detentions under the Frierson rule.
Accordingly, permitting entry of the evidence is only appropriate when the
discovery of the warrant is not the foreseeable result of intervening police
conduct. Without the intervening act of running a warrants check or inquiring
about open warrants, an officer would have no reason to believe that a given
detention would result in the discovery of a warrant. In such cases, therefore,
suppression would not deter future illegal detentions designed to uncover
warrants.
There are at least two situations in which an officer may discover an arrest
warrant during an unconstitutional encounter where that discovery is not the
foreseeable result of a warrants check or interrogation. First, the officer may
have independent knowledge of an open warrant for a particular individual,
obviating the need for a warrants check.3 ' For example, an officer may
unconstitutionally stop a car in which, coincidentally, he finds an individual he
knows to have an outstanding arrest warrant. In this scenario, the officer had
no way to know that the stop would lead to the discovery of an individual he
knew to have an outstanding warrant. To be sure, the police officer's initial
illegal detention of the individual is a but-for cause of the discovery.
Nevertheless, suppression in this case would not discourage police misconduct
because it is not foreseeable when an officer will have independent knowledge
of outstanding arrest warrants.
Discovery of an open warrant is also unforeseeable during the course of an
illegal stop when an individual voluntarily admits, without solicitation, that
there is an outstanding warrant for his arrest.3' Because an officer would have
no reason to believe ex ante that any given individual would make an
unsolicited and voluntary admission to having an outstanding warrant,
suppression will not discourage illegal detentions that involve such
unpredictable admissions.
In most cases, however, the discovery of outstanding arrest warrants
during unconstitutional detentions will take place as a result of warrants checks
or direct police questioning. In those cases, evidence obtained in the searches
incident to arrest should be suppressed. Effective deterrence of
unconstitutional police conduct requires that the foreseeable discovery of an
30. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 256 F. App'x 493, 496 (3 d Cir. 2007); United States v.
Snowden, 250 F. App'x 175, 178 (7 th Cir. 2007); State v. Thompson, 438 N.W.2d 131, 137
(Neb. 1989).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 423 F.3d 25,29 (lst Cir. 2005).
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arrest warrant cannot constitute an intervening circumstance that dissipates the
taint of an initially illegal police-citizen encounter.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has described an expanding conflict among the state
supreme courts and federal courts of appeals over an important question of
Fourth Amendment law: whether the discovery of an outstanding arrest
warrant in the course of an illegal detention dissipates the taint of the initial
illegality and permits entry of evidence seized in a search incident to arrest. It
has argued that courts holding that the discovery of a warrant attenuates the
illegality have overlooked the motivating value underlying the exclusionary
rule-deterrence of unconstitutional police conduct. Recognizing that the
courts that have upheld suppression have failed to provide a theoretical
framework for doing so, this Comment has developed one test to determine
when the discovery of a warrant attenuates the initial unconstitutionality:
whether intervening police conduct foreseeably leads to the discovery of the
warrant. Evidence should be suppressed when it is obtained in a search
incident to arrest made pursuant to an arrest warrant that was foreseeably
discovered as the result of intervening police conduct. "[T] he interest protected
by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated"-the interest in being
free from suspicionless police detentions- "would [surely] be served by
suppression of the evidence obtained" under such circumstances.32
MICHAEL KIMBERLY
32. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586,593 (2006).
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